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 Depping and Freund [this issue] provide food for thought by offering an account 
of how age-related motivational changes may translate into changes in decision pro-
cesses. In a nutshell, their ‘loss prevention’ account goes like this: first, the aging de-
cision maker faces a normal decline of resources, may they be cognitive (e.g., mem-
ory), social (e.g., death of loved ones), sensorimotor (e.g., hearing) or physical (e.g., 
health) in nature; second, experiencing this decline across domains, the decision 
maker’s motivation (goal orientation or aspiration level) transforms from accruing 
gains to preventing or slowing-down losses; third, this reorientation amplifies his or 
her awareness of the potential of losses. In this commentary, we put Depping and 
Freund’s proposal in context with other life span motivational theories and suggest 
ways to test the notion that the aging decision maker’s motivational reorientation 
prompts changes in the valuation of gains and losses in decision making.
 Choice under risk is one of the key topics of psychology and economics’ research 
in decision making. It also offers a test bed for Depping and Freund’s account be-
cause it allows researchers the detailed analyses of behavior in gain and loss domains 
as well as of possible asymmetries between the two. The valuation of gains and loss-
es is the focus of Depping and Freund’s as well as other motivational theories, for 
instance, Carstensen’s [2006] socioemotional selectivity theory. Although some em-
pirical work has already been conducted to understand the development of risky 
choice across the life span [see the review by Depping & Freund, this issue; Mata, 
Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011], the still small number of studies and the 
heterogeneous findings do not afford us to arrive at clear-cut conclusions regarding 
the role of adaptive motivational reorientation on age differences in risky choice. In 
light of this still early state of the research field, we believe that both more concep-
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tual as well as empirical work is needed. To this end, we take some steps towards 
mapping motivational accounts of the aging decision maker onto existing frame-
works of decision making.
 Motivational Change in the Aging Decision Maker 
 Depping and Freund argued convincingly that older adults’ motivational goal 
structure could be affected by a need to maintain performance in a period of life in 
which losses, relative to gains, become the rule rather than the exception, thus mak-
ing them reallocate their efforts into the prevention of losses and, concurrently, at-
tenuate their striving for gains. This thesis follows naturally from previous work 
suggesting that older adults, in contrast to young adults, tend to focus on the preven-
tion of losses rather than the striving for gains in several domains such as in the cog-
nitive, physical, and social domains [Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006]. For example, 
older adults may be more likely to try to invest effort in maintaining their existing 
social contacts (avert losses) than in expanding their social network (strive for gains). 
Such a comprehensive motivation reorientation, as Depping and Freund argue, may 
have consequences for decision-making processes in general, and more specifically, 
for the valuation of losses and gains when making decisions.
 Other theories have also linked up motivational changes associated with in-
creased age to decision processes [e.g., Carstensen, 2006; Hanoch, Wood, & Rice, 
2007; Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007]. These approaches tend to focus on 
changes related to the decision maker’s motivation to regulate emotions with ad-
vanced age, in particular, the positivity effect, by which older adults tend to be mo-
tivated to use ‘cognitive control mechanisms that enhance positive and diminish 
negative information’ in an effort to enhance well-being [Mather & Carstensen, 
2005, p. 498]. Crucially, there are some findings that suggest that this process of 
adaptive accentuation of positive relative to negative information can evoke changes 
in decision processes [e.g., Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007].
 The Prospect Theory Framework 
 Depping and Freund employed concepts from a prominent theory of risky deci-
sion making, i.e.  prospect theory [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979], to explicate their ac-
count. According to the prospect theory, human choice can be modeled as follows: 
people behave as if they multiplied some function of probability 1 and value, and then 
maximized. The value function [Tversky & Kahneman, 1992] is:
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if 0
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 1   Consequently, under the prospect theory framework, one could consider, in principle, both the 
value and probability weighting functions to account for age differences in choices involving gains, 
losses, or both. For instance, aging decision makers may weigh the impact of rare and common events 
differently than young adults [for such a proposal, see Peters et al., 2007]. Because motivational theories 
appear to focus on the valuation of gains and losses, we will focus here on the potential age differences 
in the value function. 
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 The existence of two different parameters shows that the theory makes a clear 
distinction between gains (  ) and losses (  ), relative to a reference point. In the do-
main of gains, the prospect theory assumes that outcomes have decreasing marginal 
effects as more is gained (decreasing marginal sensitivity). This leveling off with in-
creasing gains (when 0  !    ! 1) leads to a concave value function indicative of risk-
averse behavior (e.g., preferring a sure amount smaller than the expected value of a 
gamble over the opportunity to play the gamble). In the domain of losses, a similar 
leveling off of increases in disutility with increasing losses (0  !    ! 1) leads to a con-
vex function, which is associated with risk-seeking behavior (e.g., preferring a gam-
ble of possible losses over the sure loss smaller than the expected value of the gamble). 
Further, the prospect theory assumes an asymmetry in the steepness of the value 
functions for losses and gains, with a much steeper function for losses (‘losses loom 
larger than gains’). In the aforementioned equation, this steepness in the loss func-
tion is reflected in a loss aversion parameter,   , with    1 1. 
 Rather than just using concepts from the prospect theory, let us map Depping 
and Freund’s ‘loss prevention’ and Carstensen’s [2006] ‘positivity’ views onto the 
prospect theory framework. Such mapping, even if not fully justified, may help us 
elucidate in what respects the two motivational accounts differ. The ‘loss prevention’ 
view suggests at least two different ways in which motivational changes can prompt 
differences in decision making: first, older adults may show ‘stronger sensitivity to 
losses and a weaker sensitivity to gains as compared to younger adults’, and, second, 
there may be ‘age-related changes in the asymmetry of gains and losses’ [Depping & 
Freund, this issue].  Figure 1 presents these two possible (and not mutually exclusive) 
scenarios under the prospect theory framework.
 The first scenario ( fig. 1 a) suggests that there are age-specific differences in the 
decreasing marginal sensitivity to gains and losses. Specifically, when considering 
the domain of gains, older adults prove less sensitive to positive outcomes relative 
to young adults, that is, older adults derive less utility from any given gain com-
pared to their younger counterparts. In the loss domain, in contrast, older adults 
are more sensitive to any given loss relative to young adults. According to the pros-
pect theory, this pattern of gain/loss sensitivity has consequences for differences 
between young and older adults’ risk taking, with older adults’ reduced sensitivity 
in the gain domain giving rise to more risk-averse choice, and their increased sen-
sitivity in the loss domain resulting in more risk-seeking choice relative to young 
adults. In terms of the value function, the   and   parameters differ between 
younger and older decision makers but the loss aversion parameter   does not. In 
the second scenario ( fig. 1 b), in contrast, the change resides in the loss aversion pa-
rameter. That is, the asymmetry between losses and gains increases with age. Con-
sequently, there are no ‘older’ and ‘younger’ value functions in the gain domain, 
and hence, no systematic age differences in risky choice in the gain domain. In the 
loss domain, however, the augmented loss aversion for older people implies age dif-
ferences in risky choice. 
 The ‘positivity’ account ‘postulates that age-related attempts to optimize emo-
tional well-being generate increased positive emotional experiences and/or de-
creased negative emotional experiences over the life span’ [Samanez-Larkin, Gibbs, 
Khanna, Nielsen, Carstensen, & Knutson, 2007, p. 787].  Figure 1 c depicts one pos-
sible operationalization of this account: in the domain of gains, older adults show 
increased sensitivity to gains such that they derive greater utility from a given gain, 
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relative to young adults. In contrast, in the domain of losses, older adults’ emotional 
regulation enables them to be less affected by a given negative loss, relative to young 
adults. 
 As can be seen in  figure 1 , translating Depping and Freund’s loss prevention ac-
count and Carstensen’s [2006] positivity account into the prospect theory’s value 
function has an obvious advantage: it implies an immediate distinctive prediction. 
The loss prevention account predicts  increased marginal sensitivity to losses and/or 
 increased loss aversion with advanced age; the ‘positivity’ view predicts neither.
 Limitations of the Prospect Theory Framework 
 One shortcoming of mapping the motivation accounts into the prospect the-
ory is that it implies a focus on  decision utility of the gains and losses associated 
with possible outcomes of the decision in question [Kahneman, 1999]. Decision 
utility reflects the attractiveness of an outcome in the context of a decision. Moti-
vational accounts, however, are not necessarily limited to decision utility, or even 
primarily interested in decision utility. For example, motivational theories may be 
interested in distinguishing anticipated, experienced, and recalled attractiveness 
of both gain and loss outcomes [Mellers, 2000]. There is considerable debate con-
Loss prevention:
gain and loss sensitivity
Losses Losses
Gains Gains Gains
Losses
a b c
Young Young Older
Young
Young Young Older
YoungOlder Older
OlderOlder
Loss prevention:
loss aversion
Positivity:
gain and loss sensitivity
 Fig. 1. Value functions for young adults (solid lines) and older adults (dashed lines) according 
to the ‘loss prevention’ and ‘positivity’ views of the role of motivation on age differences in de-
cision making. The parameter values for younger adults are taken from Tversky and Kahneman 
[1992]:   =   = 0.88,   = 2.25.  a The first ‘loss prevention’ scenario shows reduced sensitivity to 
gains and increased sensitivity to losses by older relative to young adults (older adults:   = 0.78, 
  = 0.98,   = 2.25).  b The second ‘loss prevention’ scenario shows similar sensitivity to gains 
and losses by younger and older adults but increased loss aversion by older relative to younger 
adults (older adults:   =   = 0.88,   = 3).  c The ‘positivity’ scenario shows increased sensitivity 
to gains and reduced sensitivity to losses by older relative to young adults (older adults:   = 0.98, 
  = 0.78,   = 2.25). 
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cerning to what extent increased emotional regulation goals involve changes in 
processing positive information, negative information, or both [Hanoch et al., 
2007; Peters et al., 2007], and some findings suggest that age differences may be 
found only during the  anticipation  of  loss outcomes. Samanez-Larkin et al. [2007], 
for instance, found similar striatal and insular activations during gain anticipation 
of monetary rewards for younger and older adults, but a relative reduction in acti-
vation during loss anticipation for older relative to younger adults, and no age dif-
ferences during the experience of gain or loss outcomes. In other words, age-spe-
cific changes may occur in the anticipation of losses but disappear during the ex-
periencing of outcomes (and perhaps reappear in posterior recall) [Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005]. To put it differently: only to the extent that experienced and re-
called utility can be inferred from decision utility as conceptualized by the pros-
pect theory (and that may be unwarranted) [Kah neman, 1999] do age-specific 
changes that unfold at the anticipation phase imply age differences during the ex-
perience and remembrance phases. 
 Another limitation of the prospect theory framework is that it is a successful 
theory of decision making only in the context of  decisions from description, that is, 
in contexts in which outcomes and respective probabilities are known and conve-
niently summarized to decision makers [e.g., Erev et al., 2010]. Outside the labora-
tory, however, outcomes and probabilities are rarely known with certainty and 
served up to the decision maker on a platter. Consequently, people cannot help but 
to choose between options lacking a description of possible choice outcomes, let 
alone their probabilities. One method for overcoming such uncertainty is to sample 
the payoff distributions to learn about the options’ attractiveness and, based on the 
experienced information, to come to a decision. Such  decisions from experience 
[Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004] lead to choices that are systematically and 
predictably different from decisions from description [Hertwig & Erev, 2009]. Sev-
eral factors have been proposed to contribute to these differences, including the re-
liance on small samples, memory effects (e.g., recency), and distinct predecisional 
search policies in decisions from experience [e.g., Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 
2008; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010; Hills & Hertwig, 2010]. These factors – on all of 
them the prospect theory is mute – are particularly likely to be subject to age-spe-
cific changes.
 Still another limitation of using the prospect theory framework as a theoretical 
sounding board of motivational theories is that the prospect theory assumes that 
choices can be described by stable preferences or attitudes in the valuation of gains 
and losses (and their probabilities). However, there is widespread skepticism in the 
decision making literature regarding the existence of stable risk preferences [Fox & 
Tennanbaum, 2011; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2011]. First, behavioral and self-report 
measures of risk taking show very limited predictive value of real-world risk taking 
[Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, & Wagner, 2005]. Second, there is ample 
evidence that risky behavior varies as a function of activities [e.g., Hanoch, Johnson, 
& Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002], problem domain [Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001], and recent experience with particular outcomes 
or probabilities [Ungemach, Stewart, & Reimers, 2011]. These and many related find-
ings put the assumption of stable risk preferences (for both younger and older people) 
in jeopardy.
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 The Strategy Framework 
 One alternative to the prospect theory framework that does not rest on the as-
sumption of stable preferences involves specifying the heuristics or cognitive strate-
gies that are used to search and integrate information prior to a decision [Brandstät-
ter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2011]. Such models walk in 
the footsteps of Simon [1959] and represent possible implementation of his core con-
cepts of aspiration levels and satisficing. In Simon’s framework, motivational chang-
es are conceptualized and modeled as changes in aspiration levels or thresholds that 
determine when enough information has been acquired or integrated. For example, 
a recent model that is explicit about the memory demands involved in choice embod-
ies these ideas through a stopping rule that determines when search should be 
stopped in decisions from experience [Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011]. More importantly, 
these strategies, in particular those that are lexicographic in nature (i.e., in which 
information is considered sequentially), offer a way to understand how it is possible 
that a user of the heuristic may seem to show risk-averse behavior one minute and 
risk-seeking behavior the next only to switch back to what appears to be risk aversion 
again. This pattern of behavior does not reflect unstable risk preferences, however, 
but rather follows directly from the sequential processing steps (each one represent-
ing a different risk preference) and the interaction of the heuristic’s architecture with 
the choice environment [Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2011]. 
 This strategy framework would suggest that age-specific differences in risk 
choice occur because (a) older people use different choice strategies than younger 
people (e.g., rely more often on the minimax heuristic, whereas younger people re-
cruit the maximax heuristic), or (b) the strategy remains the same but some compo-
nents of the strategy (e.g., the aspiration level used to determine whether two losses 
are treated to be identical in magnitude or different) [Brandstätter et al., 2006] change 
as a function of age. 
 Where to Go from Here 
 Let us briefly summarize what we see as immediate fruitful research directions 
that follow from Depping and Freund and our commentary. First and foremost, 
which of the implementations of the loss prevention and positivity accounts ( fig. 1 ) 
predicts differences in risky choice (to the extent that they exist) between older and 
younger decision makers best? 
 Second, it has become clear that motivational theories need to specify the reach 
of their predictions, in particular, whether there are age-specific changes that unfold 
at the anticipation, experience, and remembrance phases. The temporal location of 
age-specific difference in the process of rendering a decision is an open question well 
deserving to be settled empirically.
 Third, the distinction between decisions from experience and description seems 
particularly relevant to studying age differences in risky choice because of the differ-
ences in learning and memory demands that characterize the two paradigms, on the 
one hand, and age-related decline in learning, on the other [Eppinger, Hämmerer, & 
Li, 2011]. On the basis of a meta-analysis, Mata et al. [2011] found that age-related 
differences in risky choice vary systematically as a function of the learning require-
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ments of the decision task. Older adults were more risk seeking compared to young 
adults when learning fostered risk-avoidant behavior, but were more risk averse when 
learning fostered risk-seeking behavior. In tasks involving decisions from descrip-
tion, however, young and older adults’ choices did not show systematic differences 
for the majority of the tasks. 
 Fourth, the distinction between description-based and experience-based choic-
es is also highly relevant for the ‘loss prevention’ and the ‘positivity’ accounts, and 
their focus on valuation of gains and losses. Mata et al. [2011] analyzed whether 
young and older adults differed in their decisions from description as a function of 
gain or loss framing. They found only a small number of studies that compared 
choices of young and older adults in the gain (n = 11) and loss domain (n = 10), re-
spectively. All studies offered participants the choice between a risky gamble and a 
sure option (A: winning USD 10 with 0.5 probability, or USD 0 with 0.5 probability; 
B: winning USD 5 for sure). Across studies, the results suggest a heterogeneous pat-
tern of findings but no mean difference in risk taking as a function of age for either 
gain or loss domains in decisions from description. In other words, decisions from 
descriptions do not appear to give rise to the implied differences in risky choices as 
a function of age ( fig. 1 ). However, this lack of difference in description-based choic-
es does not mean that no differences exist in experience-based choices. Unfortu-
nately, Mata et al. [2011] were unable to conduct an analysis separately for gain and 
loss domains in decisions-from-experience studies. Some paradigms in decisions 
from experience are not amenable to such distinction or the data reported did not 
allow meaningful comparison for gain and loss domains separately. 
 Conclusion 
 Depping and Freund proposed that age-related changes in the motivation to 
improve versus maintain existing performance levels in important life domains im-
plicate concurrent changes in the valuation of gains and losses in the process of mak-
ing decisions. Research on human choice under risk is an adequate test bed for Dep-
ping and Freund’s thesis. We suggest that taking steps toward translating the loss 
prevention notion (and competing theories) into the existing framework of risky 
choice can help to derive distinct predictions, thus increasing the power of future 
empirical tests.
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